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FROM	Director of Central Intelligence		DATE	15 June 1960
SUBJECT	U-2 Incident		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED	For information.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)				
<p>1. Over the past month, CIA has been the subject of an unprecedented volume of publicity centering around the U-2 project. The press in this country and abroad has devoted an enormous amount of space to reporting and analyzing all aspects of the incident on 1 May. We are glad that the publicity is now diminishing and believe that it will continue to do so.</p> <p>2. Undesirable as exposure is, we can take comfort from the fact that in this country and in other free world areas, there has been a gratifying recognition of the Agency's efforts and, even more important, an awareness of the continuing need for intelligence activities.</p> <p>3. On the whole, domestic opinion has been overwhelmingly favorable to the Agency. The leaders of Congress have generally praised the Agency's role; responsible newspapers have supported the need to collect intelligence; and hundreds of private citizens have written directly to express their support. There has been some adverse criticism, of course, but this has been concentrated on incidental parts of the operations or against policy decisions which did not involve the Agency.</p> <p>4. We have achieved two principal things. One, the results of this collection effort have significantly benefited national security. Two, we have demonstrated to the world that such an operation can be conducted in secrecy for over four years. All of the people involved, and this includes representatives of all of the intelligence components in our government, have performed efficiently and securely and they are to be highly praised.</p> <p>5. I am enclosing a copy of my statement made in Executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A similar statement was made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This statement has <u>not</u> been made public and it should not be disclosed. It should be closely held by you and your immediate staff. There are also enclosed statements by the President, Representative Clarence Cannon and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson.</p> <p>6. The official inquiries are about completed, and it is now time to look ahead. The past month has not changed any of the priority targets for intelligence collection. The Communists stand exposed to the world as obsessed with secrecy, and as still motivated by a hostile attitude toward the United States. It now falls on all of us to increase our efforts and to bring all our ingenuity to bear in devising new methods to collect the intelligence which is vital to our national security.</p>				
 ALLEN W. DULLES				
ATTACHMENTS:				
1. Statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 2. Excerpts from President's Press Conference 11 May 1960. 3. Remarks of Representative Cannon before House, 10 May 1960. 4. Statement of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson before Senate, 10 May 1960.				
FORM 53b 10-67 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-28 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

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ATT. 1

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S E C R E T

STATEMENT BY
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
to the
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON 31 MAY 1960

The duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under statute and under National Security Council directives pursuant to statute, is to provide the President and the National Security Council with evaluated intelligence relating to our national security.

The Agency has no policy or police functions.

In addition, however, the Agency has the duty, within policy limitations prescribed by the President and State Department, to do whatever is within its power to collect and produce the intelligence required by the policy makers in government, to deal with the dangers we face in the world today, a nuclear world.

Increasingly over the past ten years, the main target for our intelligence collection has been the U.S.S.R., its military, its economic, and its subversive potential.

The carrying out of this task has been rendered extremely difficult because the Soviet Union is a closed society.

Great areas of the U.S.S.R. are curtained off to the outside world. Their military preparations are made in secret. Their military hardware, ballistic missiles, bombers, nuclear weapons, and submarine forces, as far as physically possible, are concealed from us. They have resisted all efforts to realize mutual inspection or "open skies."

The ordinary tools of information gathering, under these circumstances are not wholly adequate. These ordinary tools include both the normal overt means of obtaining information, and the classical covert means generally referred to as espionage.

It is true that from these sources and from the many Soviet defectors who have come over to the Free World and from disaffected and disillusioned Soviet nationals, we obtain very valuable information.

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However, these sources and other sources developed through the application of various scientific techniques, while very helpful, did not give us the full intelligence protection this country required against the danger of preparation for surprise attack against us, from bases which might remain unknown and by weapons, the strength and power of which we might not be able adequately to evaluate.

Almost equally serious had been our lack of knowledge of Soviet defense measures against our retaliatory striking power.

Shackled by traditions, we were seeing the power of attack grow while the ability to secure the intelligence necessary for defense against attack was slipping, bound down in part by tradition.

For example, while Soviet spy trawlers can lurk a few miles off our shores and observe us with impunity, the Soviets cry "aggression" when a plane, invisible to the naked eye, flies over it some fifteen miles above the ground.

Either, theoretically, could carry a nuclear weapon. The trawler could deal a much more serious nuclear blow than a light reconnaissance plane.

But, of course, as we well know, no one would think of starting a nuclear war with either an isolated plane or ship.

In this age of nuclear peril we, the Central Intelligence Agency, felt that a new approach was called for in the whole field of intelligence collection.

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This was the situation, when in 1954, almost six years ago, consultation was initiated on new intelligence collection techniques. We consulted with a group of highly competent technicians in and out of government. From our discussions there emerged the concept of a high-flying, high performance reconnaissance plane. In the then state of the art of aeronautics, it was confidently believed that a plane could be designed to fly unintercepted over the vitally important closed areas of the Soviet Union, where ballistic, nuclear, and other military preparations against us were being made.

We also believed, as a result of these consultations, that the art of photography could be so advanced as to make the resolution of the pictures taken, even at extreme altitudes, of very great significance. On both counts the accomplishments exceeded expectations.

While the developmental work for this project, pursuant to high policy directive was in process, there came the Summit Conference of July 1955.

Here, in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the "open skies" proposal. Moscow summarily rejected anything of this nature, and Soviet security measures continued to be reinforced.

Accordingly, the U-2 project was pushed forward rapidly, and about a year after the 1955 summit meeting the first operational U-2 flight over the Soviet Union took place. For almost four years the flight program has been carried forward successfully.

Speed in getting the program underway had been a top priority. We were then faced, that is in 1955-1956, with a situation where the Soviets were continuing to develop their missiles, their heavy bomber and bomber bases, and their nuclear weapons production without adequate knowledge on our part.

This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable both from the viewpoint of adequate military preparation on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to take counter-measures in the event of attack.

It was recognized at the outset that this U-2 project had its risks and had a limited span of life due to improvement of counter measures; that a relatively fragile single-engine plane of the nature of the U-2 might one day have a flame-out or other malfunction in the rarified atmosphere in which it had to travel. If that resulted in a serious and prolonged loss of altitude, there was danger of failure and discovery.

To stop any enterprise of this nature because there are risks, would be, of course, in this field to accomplish very little.

While air reconnaissance is an old and tried method of gaining intelligence, a peacetime operation of this particular type and on this scale was unique.

But I submit that we live in an age when old concepts of the limits of "permitted" techniques for acquiring information are totally outdated. They come from the horse and buggy days.

I see no reason whatever to draw an unfavorable distinction between the collection of information by reconnaissance at a high altitude in the air and espionage carried on by individuals who illegally operate directly within the territory of another state.

In fact, the distinction, if one is to be drawn, would favor the former. The illegal espionage agents generally attempt to suborn and subvert the citizens of the countries in which they operate. High level air reconnaissance in no way disturbs the life of the people. It does not harm their property. They do not even notice it.

I believe these techniques should/universally be sanctioned on a mutual basis and become an accepted and agreed part of our international arrangements.

The USSR has known a good deal about these flights for the last four years. It has studiously refrained from giving the people of the Soviet Union the knowledge they now admit they had.

* * * * *

With respect to the U-2 project, I am prepared to support and document these conclusions:--

First, that this operation was one of the most valuable intelligence collection operations that any country has ever mounted at any time, and that it was vital to our national security.

Second, that the chain of command and authority for the project was clear.

Third, that every overflight was carefully planned, fully authorized, and, until May 1, 1960, effectively carried out.

Fourth, that the technical and logistic support was prompt and efficient.

Fifth, that the security which was maintained for this project over a period of more than five years has been unique.

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I shall deal with these points in the inverse order in which I have presented them.

First - security. The project was run by a small, closely knit organization at headquarters and in the field. Knowledge of the operation was restricted to a minimum. Over more than five years, since the inception of the project, there has never been any damaging disclosure to interfere with the program.

The existence of the U-2 aircraft was, of course, well known, though its full capabilities, particularly the altitude and range were not disclosed. It had important weather and air sampling capabilities which were effectively used and which afforded natural cover for the project. These weather capabilities were open and publicized.

For example, as far as I know the U-2 is the first aircraft that has ever flown over the eye of a typhoon. It was used very effectively out in the Far East to learn about typhoons which cause so much damage, and we have a very extraordinary series of pictures of the U-2 looking right down at the eye of a typhoon from several miles above the top of it. Of course, the U-2 also had very valuable characteristics as a reconnaissance plane for peripheral flights.

With regard to technical and logistic support:--from the inception of the project, CIA has called on the United States Air Force for support in the form of technical advice and assistance in those fields where the Air Force has the most expert knowledge. These included advice on aircraft design and procurement, operational training of air crews, weather, aero-medicine and communications. I may say the Air Force liberally gave all this support to us.

The CIA also drew on the technical knowledge and advice of those members of the United States Intelligence Board with particular competence in the field of intelligence priorities, -- targeting and the like. Each mission was carefully planned with respect to the highest priority requirements of the Intelligence Community.

The project has been directed by a senior civilian in CIA with high competence in this area of work. He was responsible directly to me and, of course, to General Cabell.

Since the inception of CIA - going back for ten years - personnel from the military services, including the Air Force, have been detailed to CIA for tours of duty. We have had as

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8 or 9 hundred of them at one time. These personnel take their orders from CIA, not from their parent service, during their period of detail. The U-2 project, under its civilian director, drew upon both the military and civilian personnel of the Agency. They were assigned to duties in headquarters and in the field staffs which were responsible for carrying out the technical functions of the program. They were chosen in view of their particular qualifications for this particular project.

Third, every overflight, from the inception of the project, and every phase of it, was carefully planned and staffed.

From time to time intelligence requirements were reviewed, and programs of one or more missions were authorized by higher authority.

Within the authority thus granted, specific flights could then be carried out on the order of the Director of Central Intelligence, as availability and readiness of aircraft and of pilot and as weather conditions permitted.

On the afternoon of 30 April last, after carefully considering the field report on the weather and other determining factors affecting the flight then contemplated, and after consultation with General Cabell and other qualified advisors in the Agency, and acting within existing authority to make a flight at that time, I personally gave the order to proceed with the flight of May first.

There was no laxity or uncertainty in the chain of command in obtaining the authority to act or in giving the order to proceed. With respect to the flight authorized on April 30, the same careful procedures were followed as had been followed in the many preceding successful flights.

Now I wish to discuss the value to the country of these flights from the intelligence viewpoint and from the viewpoint of national security considerations. I shall do this within the limitations of what I think both you and I feel are the necessary security restrictions.

Under the law setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, as Director, I am enjoined to protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Naturally I recognize this Committee as an authorized body to whom disclosures can properly be made that should not be made publicly. In so doing I wish to keep within the bounds of what I believe you would agree to be in the national interest to disclose, even here.

I feel that you should share the facts which I confidently believe justified the obvious risks of this project. Such risks were recognized and evaluated at all stages of the project.

For many years, the United States Intelligence Community has been directing its efforts to provide the information which would help to meet the threat of surprise attack. Every available means in the classical intelligence field have been utilized, and over recent years these have been valuably supplemented by the highly technical electronic and other scientific means to which I have referred.

Our main emphasis in the U-2 program has been directed against five critical problems affecting our national security. These are: the Soviet bomber force, the Soviet missile program, the Soviet atomic energy program, the Soviet submarine program. These are the major elements constituting the Soviet Union's capability to launch a surprise attack. In addition, a major target during this program has been the Soviet air defense system with which our retaliatory force would have to contend, in case of an attack on us and a counterattack by us.

Today, the Soviet bomber force is still the main offensive long range striking force of the Soviet Union. However, the U-2 program has helped to confirm that only a greatly reduced long-range bomber production program is continuing in the Soviet Union. It has established, however, that the Soviet Union has recently developed a new medium bomber with supersonic capabilities.

The U-2 program has covered many Soviet long-range bomber airfields, confirming estimates of the location of bases and the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers. It has also acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them.

Our overflights have enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground facilities involved.

With respect to the Soviet missile test program -- this I shall illustrate graphically by showing you the photograph of these facilities, including both their ICBM and their IRBM test launching sites which could, of course, also become and may well be, operational sites.

Our photography has also provided us valuable insight into the problem of Soviet doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. It has taught us much about the use which the Soviets are making of these sites for the training of troops in the operational use of the short and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

The program has provided valuable information on the Soviet atomic energy program. This information has been included in the estimate which we give periodically to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but without referring to the actual source of our data. This has covered the production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, and size of many stockpile sites.

The project has shown that, despite Mr. Khrushchev's boasts that the Soviets will soon be able to curtail the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the Soviets are continuing to expand fissionable material capacity.

The Soviet nuclear testing grounds have been photographed more than once with extremely interesting results. The photography has also given us our first firm information on the magnitude and location of the USSR's domestic uranium ore and uranium processing activities, vital in estimating Soviet fissionable material production. We have located national and regional nuclear storage sites and forward storage facilities.

In general, the program has continued to give useful data on the size and rate of growth of Soviet industry.

The material obtained has been used for the correction of military maps and aeronautical charts.

Among the most important intelligence obtained is that affecting the tactics of the United States deterrent air strike force. We now have hard information about the nature, extent, and in many cases, the location of the Soviet ground-to-air missile development. We have learned much about the basic concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, deployment, and rate of development of the Soviet air defense system, including their early warning radar development.

We have obtained photographs of many scores of fighter air fields previously inadequately identified, and have photographed various fighter-types vainly attempting to intercept the U-2. All of this has proved invaluable to SAC in adjusting its plans to known elements of the opposition it would have to face.

As a result of the concrete evidence acquired by the U-2 program on a large number of targets in the Soviet Union, it has now been possible for U.S. commanders to make a more efficient and confident allocation of aircraft, crews and weapons.

U-2 photography has also made it possible to provide new and accurate information to strike crews which will make it easier for them to identify their targets and plan their navigation more precisely.

We have obtained new and valuable information with regard to submarine deployment and the precise location of their submarine pens.

In the opinion of our military, of our scientists, and of the senior officials responsible for our national security, the results of the program have been invaluable.

The program has had other elements of value. It has made the Soviets less cocky about their ability to deal with what we might bring against them.

They have gone through four years of frustration in having the knowledge since 1956 that they could be overflowed with impunity, that their vaunted fighters were useless against such flights, and that their ground-to-air missile capability was inadequate.

Khrushchev has never dared expose this to his own people. It is only after he had boasted, and we believe falsely, that he had been able to bring down the U-2 on May 1 by a ground-to-air missile while flying at altitude, that he has allowed his own people to have even an inkling of the capability which we possessed.

His frustrated military, many of whom know the facts, are far less confident today than they otherwise would have been.

At the same time, in competent military circles among our allies, the evidence of American capability demonstrated by the present disclosure of the U-2 flights has given a new and better perspective of our own relative strength as compared with that of the Soviet Union.

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At this point I propose to show you some photographs to support my presentation regarding the intelligence value of the project.

Now I shall present the facts with regard to the dispatch of the May 1 flight and the ensuing developments insofar as the intelligence aspects are concerned and insofar as they are known to us.

As to the timing of the flight, there is, of course, no good time for a failure.

I have already presented the circumstances under which I assumed direct responsibility for dispatching this flight.

If this flight had been a success, we would have covered certain targets of particular significance and we would, in the normal course, have wished to analyze its results before scheduling a further mission. When it failed, it was obvious even before we received instructions that we would not try again before studying the cause and effects of failure. In either event, success or failure, after this flight we were not preparing to fly again for several weeks and until further policy guidance was received.

With respect to the timing of the flights, the President, in his speech of May 25, had this to say: "As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

"The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack."

I would point out, also, that if you turn off all flights for months before international meetings and then for some time after such meetings and before trips to the Soviet Union of high American officials or trips here of Soviet officials; if you also estimate that in times of tension flights should be stopped because they might increase the tension, and in times of sweetness and light they should not be run because it would disturb any "honeymoon" in our relations with the Soviet Union; if, on top of this, you take into account that in much of the Soviet Union most days of the year are automatically eliminated because of weather and cloud cover and low Arctic sun, - then you can understand the problem of timing of flights.

If you asked me whether or not a flight would have been made after this particular flight, I cannot give you the answer because I do not know. At the time, we had no authority for any mission other than the one that was then undertaken.

With respect to the flight itself, when the aircraft did not reach its destination within the flight time and fuel capacity given it, it was presumed to be down. But at first we did not know where. It could have been within friendly

territory, in hostile desert, or in uninhabited territory, or within hostile territory where if alive the pilot would have been quickly apprehended as was the case. We did not know whether the plane was intact or destroyed, the pilot alive or dead.

I shall deal in a moment with the statements which were issued during this period of uncertainty.

The question of course arises as to what actually happened to cause this aircraft to come down deep in the heart of Russia.

Let me remind you first that the returns are not yet all in, and so our picture is not complete. However, we do have a considerable body of evidence that permits a reasonable judgment with a high degree of confidence.

Our best judgment is that it did not happen as claimed by the Soviets. That is, we believe that it was not shot down at its operating altitude of around 70,000 feet by the Russians. We believe that it was initially forced down to a much lower altitude by some as yet undetermined mechanical malfunction. At that lower altitude, it was a sitting duck for Soviet defenses, whether fighter aircraft or ground-to-air fire or missiles.

As to what happened at the lower altitude, we are not sure. The pilot may have bailed out at any time or he may have crash landed. The aircraft was equipped with a destruction device to be activated by the pilot as he leaves the aircraft. Again we do not know whether or not he attempted to do so. It should be noted, however, that no massive destruction device capable of ensuring complete destruction could be carried in this aircraft as weight limitations were critical, and every pound counted.

Thus, whether or not the destruction device was used, one might expect sizable and identifiable parts of the aircraft and its equipment to remain.

As to the nature and cause of the suspected malfunction, we are not prepared to pass judgment. But let me remind you that this aircraft and this pilot had proven their high degree of reliability in many technically similar flights, inside and outside friendly territory. When operating as in this case, about 1200 miles within unfriendly, heavily-defended territory, there can be no cushion against malfunction.

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There has been much comment and questioning with regard to the pilot and his behavior after apprehension. Of course, we only have the Soviets' report on all of this, and we should accept it with caution.

All of the pilots engaged in this enterprise were most carefully selected. They were highly trained, highly motivated, and, as seemed right, well compensated financially. But no one in his right mind would have accepted these risks for money alone.

Since the operational phase of the program started, the reliability record of the plane, for a craft of this character, was little short of phenomenal. It was a tribute to the high skill of the designer, the maintenance crews, and the pilots. Until the May first flight, over about a four-year period of operations, no plane had been lost over unfriendly territory in the course of many, many missions. Several were lost during the training period at home and in friendly territory abroad.

Francis Gary Powers, the pilot on the May 1 flight, is a fourth generation American citizen, born in Jenkins, Kentucky, about 31 years ago. He received a BA degree from Milligan College, Tennessee, in September 1956. Scholastically he was high average. He joined the Air Force in the fall of 1950, as a private and served in an enlisted status until November 1951, when he was discharged as a Corporal in order to enter the Aviation Cadet School to train as a pilot. He attended the Air Force Basic and Advance Pilot Training School at Greenville, Mississippi. Upon completion of this training in December 1952, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant.

His first duty assignment was as an F-84 Commando Jet Pilot with the 468th Strategic Fighter Squadron at Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. He resigned his Air Force Reserve Commission under honorable conditions in May 1956. The reason for such resignation was to join the project we are discussing.

His record with the Air Force had been uniformly good. He was given a special security screening by the Air Force and also a supplemental check by the security office of the CIA.

During his Air Force career, he received training with respect to his behavior and conduct in event of capture, and after entering the employ of the Agency, he took the Agency's escape and evasion course at our training station here in the United States in June of 1956. He had subsequent training in escape and evasion after his assignment to his overseas post in August 1956..

An Air Force Major Flight Surgeon assigned to CIA who worked with the U-2 pilots during their training in the United

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and continuously during their stay overseas, had this to say in regard to Francis Powers, "....During the period of my assignment as Flight Surgeon at Adana, I not infrequently shared a room with Mr. Powers and participated in social, flying, and mission duties with him. In my opinion Mr. Powers was outstanding among the pilots for his calmness under pressure, his precision, and his methodical approach to problems. I have flown considerably in jets with Mr. Powers. I would consider him temperate, devoted, perhaps more than unusually patriotic, and a man given to thinking before speaking or acting."

It should be remembered that Powers was a pilot, navigator, a well-rounded aviator trained to handle himself under all conditions, in the air or if grounded in hostile territory. He was not trained as an "agent" as there were no foreseeable circumstances, even the present ones, where he would act as such. Furthermore, such training would have been incompatible both temperamentally and with the strenuous technical demands of his flight missions.

The pilots of these aircrafts on operational missions, and this was true in the case of Powers, received the following instructions for use if downed in a hostile area:

First, it was their duty to ensure the destruction of the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible.

Second, on reaching the ground it was the pilot's first duty to attempt escape and evasion so as to avoid capture, or delay it as long as possible. To aid him in these purposes and for survival he was given the various items of equipment which the Soviets have publicized and which are normal and standard procedure, selected on the basis of wide experience gained in World War II and in Korea.

Third, pilots were equipped with a device for self destruction but were not given positive instructions to make use of it. In the last analysis, this ultimate decision has to be left to the individual himself.

Fourth, in the contingency of capture, pilots were instructed to delay as long as possible the revelation of damaging information.

Fifth, pilots were instructed to tell the truth if faced with a situation, as apparently faced Powers, with respect to those matters which were obviously within the knowledge of his captors as a result of what fell into their hands. In addition, if in a position where some attribution had to be given his mission, he would acknowledge that he was working for the Central Intelligence Agency. This was to make it clear that he was not working for any branch of the armed services, and that his mission was solely an intelligence mission.

These instructions were based on a careful study of our experience in the Korean war of the consequences of brain-washing and of the extent of information which could be obtained by these and other means available to the Soviets.

Whether or not in this instance the pilot complied with all of these instructions, it is hard to state today with the knowledge we have. However, a careful review of what he has said does not indicate that he has given to the Soviets any valuable information which they could not have discovered from the equipment they found upon the pilot's person or retrieved from the downed aircraft.

I would warn, of course, against putting too much belief in what Powers may say, particularly if he is later put on trial. By that time they will have had a more thorough opportunity for a complete brain-washing operation which might well produce a mixture of truth and fiction.

I will now deal with the "cover story" statements which were issued following May 1.

When a plane is overdue and the fact of its takeoff and failure to return is known, some statement must be made, and quickly. Failure to do so, and, under normal conditions, to start a search for the lost plane, would in itself be a suspicious event.

Thus, when the U-2 disappeared on May first and did not return to its base within the requisite time period after its takeoff, action was required.

For many years, in fact since the inception of the operation, consideration has been given to the cover story which would be used in the case of the disappearance of a plane which might possibly be over unfriendly territory.

Because of its special characteristics, the U-2 plane was of great interest to the U.S. weather services and to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the predecessor of NASA. NASA was very much concerned with the scientific advances which operations of these U-2s could make towards greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for other scientific purposes. As already indicated, U-2s have now undertaken many weather and related missions and their functions in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has been distributed freely to the world.

It was therefore natural that NASA's operations be used to explain the presence of U-2s at various bases throughout

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the world, although NASA did not participate in the development of intelligence devices, nor did they participate in the planning and conduct of any intelligence missions.

Accordingly, when the May first flight was lost, an initial statement was issued on May 2nd by the Base Commandant at Adana that a U-2 aircraft, engaged in upper air studies and operating from the base was down, and oxygen difficulties had been reported. This was identified in the press as a NASA plane. A search for the plane was initiated in the remote areas of eastern Turkey.

On May 5, early in the day by our time, Khrushchev made his claim that "an American aircraft crossed our frontier and continued its flight into the interior of our country... and... was shot down." At that time, Khrushchev gave no further details of significance.

Apparently as an attempt at deception, Khrushchev followed up his speech the next day by distributing photographs of a pile of junk -- according to experts, pieces of an old Soviet fighter plane -- possibly for the purpose of making us think that the U-2 plane had been effectively destroyed. Since the fake wreckage was quickly identified for what it was, this particular ruse had no effect.

The NASA statement which followed the Khrushchev speech of May 5 developed somewhat further the original cover story. Also on May 5, the Department of State issued a further release which generally followed the cover story. Mr. Dillon has covered this in his testimony before this Committee on May 27.

At this time - on 5-6 May - we still did not know whether the plane or any recognizable parts of it or the pilot were in Soviet hands, or whether the pilot was dead or alive. Furthermore, then we did not know whether Khrushchev desired to blow up the incident as he later did, or put it under the rug and spare his people the knowledge that we had been overflying them.

Hence, in this situation, there seemed no reason at that time to depart from the original cover story.

These two press releases attributed to NASA were worked out in consultation between CIA and NASA and after conferring with the Department of State.

These statements did not come out of any lack of forethought or attention to their preparation or lack of coordination. The basic cover story had been developed some years ago for the

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exigency of a failure, and this original cover story was on May 5 modified to meet our then estimate of what was best to say in the light of what little we knew about the details of the May 1 flight failure.

Subsequently, on May 7, Khrushchev adduced evidence that he had the pilot alive, and quoted his purported statements. He also produced certain of the contents of the plane and later various parts of the plane itself. This clearly disclosed the true nature of the mission on which the plane was engaged.

The cover story was outflanked.

The issue then was whether to admit the incident but deny high level responsibility, or to take the course which was decided upon and clearly expressed in Secretary Herter's statement of May 9 and in the President's statement of May 11, and his address of May 25.

In Mr. Herter's appearance before this Committee, he has dealt with the statements which were issued during the period after May 6, except for the two statements involving NASA which I have covered.

I would only add that in my opinion, in the light of all the factors involved, the decision taken to assume responsibility in this particular case was the correct one. Denial, in my opinion, over the long run would have been tortuous and self defeating.

Those who took this decision knew that I was ready to assume the full measure of responsibility and to cover the project as a technical intelligence operation carried out on my own responsibility as Director of CIA. This alternative, too, was rejected because of the many elements making it hardly credible over the longer run.

* * * * *

This concludes my statement respecting the intelligence aspects of the U-2 project.

S E C R E T

EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON U-2 INCIDENT
11 May 1960

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER—Good morning. Please sit down. I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident.

A full statement about this matter has been made by the State Department and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by leaders of both parties.

For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to say, with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further to say—for the simple reason I can think of nothing to add that might be useful at this time.

The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activities. No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack.

Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.

As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

My second point: The nature of intelligence-gathering activities.

"BELOW THE SURFACE"

These have a special and secret character. They are, so to speak, "below the surface" activities. They are secret because they must circumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military preparations.

They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities.

These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of force—with operations supervised by responsible officials within this area of secret activities.

We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities, and second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given latitude under broad directives, but must be kept under strict control in every detail.

These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment which seek to mislead and obscure—just as in the Soviet allegations there are many discrepancies. For example, there is some reason to believe that the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude. The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special efforts to conceal them.

Third point:

Third point: How should we view all of this activity?

DISTASTEFUL BUT VITAL

It is a distasteful but vital necessity. We prefer and work for a different kind of world—and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.

This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955, which I was ready instantly to put into effect—to permit aerial observation over the United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that no surprise attack was being prepared against anyone. I shall bring up the "open skies" proposal again at Paris—since it is a means of ending concealment and suspicion.

My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues of the day by what is an incident or a stnotin if the world situation today.

This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed non-military plane can only reflect a fetish of secrecy.

The real issues are the ones we will be working on at the Summit—disarmament, search for solutions affecting Germany and Berlin and the whole range of East-West relations, including the reduction of secrecy and suspicion.

Frankly, I am hopeful that we may make progress on these great issues. This is what we mean when we speak of "working for peace."

And as I remind you, I will have nothing further to say about this matter.

* * * * *

MERRIMAN SMITH of United Press International—Mr. President, quite aside from your comment about the U-2 plane episode, sir, I wonder if you could give us your reaction to a rather denunciatory speech made this morning, right ahead of the Summit meeting, by the Russian Foreign Minister. Mr. Gromyko attributes to this country deeds and efforts which he said amount to dangerous ways of balancing on the brink of war. He says that the United States has deliberately engaged in provocative acts in conjunction with some of our Allies.

Now, with statements like this, do you still maintain a hopeful attitude toward the Summit?

A.—Well, I'd say yes. I have some hope, because these things have been said for many years, ever since World War II, and there is no real change in this matter.

Now, if we—I wonder how many of you people have read the full text of the Abel trial, the record of the trial of Mr. Abel /Rudolph Abel, convicted Soviet spy. Well, I think he was sentenced to thirty years. Now, this business of saying that you're doing things that are provocative, why, they had better look at their own record. And, I'll tell you this: The United States and none of its Allies that I know of has engaged in nothing that would be considered honestly as provocative. We are looking to our own security and our defense and we have no idea of promoting any kind of conflict or war. This is just, it's absolutely ridiculous and they know it is.

HENRY N. TAYLOR

HENRY N. TAYLOR of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers—Mr. President, sir, would it be trespassing on your request about the U-2 to ask if you could tell us something about any possible Soviet reconnaissance flights over the Western part of the world, and our response to them, if any?

A.—Well, I could just say this: as far as I know, there has never been any over the United States.

CHARLES W. ROBERTS of Newsweek—Sir, in connection with the Abel trial which you mentioned—the Soviet Government in that case made no effort to defend Colonel Abel. I wonder if an American citizen were arrested by a foreign government government and brought to trial as a spy, what the policy of this Government would be so far as his defense was concerned?

A.—Well, we would certainly offer the good offices of our embassy, and see whether there was anything we could do. Of course, we would have to do it, it would be an internal matter there and we would have to do it with the permission of the other country. So far as I — I think that if there is anything wrong diplomatically with my answer, you had better ask the State Department , but I think that would be the result.

MARVIN L. ARROW-SMITH of The Associated Press—Mr. President, you have said many times that you wouldn't go to the Summit under any threats or ultimatums. Yesterday, as you know, the Soviets in their note threatened retaliation against us if we continued to fly these planes over their territory. Do you regard that kind of threat as within the category you were speaking of?

A.—No. I think that you have to set that aside in a special category. I don't believe it's the kind of thing that you call an ultimatum at all.

EDWARD P. MORGAN of American Broadcasting Company—Mr. President, a point of clarification, Mr. President: Do we infer correctly that your prepared statement this morning is the final, complete and ultimate answer to your critics, friendly and hostile, on the subject?

A.—I said that at this time I could see nothing useful more that I could say, so that's where I stand at this moment.

JOHN SCALI of the Associated Press—Mr. President, you said in your initial statement that the Soviet account of the downing of this plane contained many discrepancies, and that there was reason to doubt that the plane was downed at a high altitude, as Mr. Khrushchev claims.

Can you tell us, sir, whether the Administration at some future time intends to expose these discrepancies, and can you at this time without violating what you have said, give us any more details about how we believe this plane actually came down in the Soviet Union?

A.—Well, I don't think I am—you raise a question that is really an auxiliary to the main issue, and so I don't mind saying this: That, take the pictures themselves, we know that they were not, or we believe we know that they are not pictures of the plane that was downed, and there are other things in their statements.

Now, I don't know what's going to happen in the future, but these things you can be sure will be carefully looked into. And, as again I say, I do not foreclose any kind of statement that in the future may be necessary. I am saying that now I can see nothing more useful to say.

REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN CLARENCE A. CANNON (MISSOURI),
CONCERNING U-2 INCIDENT, BEFORE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
10 May 1960

MR. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, on May 1 the Soviet Government captured, 1,300 miles inside the boundaries of the Russian Empire, an American plane, operated by an American pilot, under the direction and control of the Central Intelligence Agency, and is now holding both the plane and the pilot.

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the appropriation was familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions.

The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the utmost confidence.

The question immediately arises as to the authority of the subcommittee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes, and especially the failure of the subcommittee to divulge to the House and the country the justifications warranting the expenditure and all details connected with the item at the time it was under consideration on the floor.

The answer of the subcommittee is absolute and unavoidable military necessity, fundamental national defense.

During the Second World War the United States succeeded in breaking the Japanese naval code. Through this incredible good fortune the U.S. commanders were able to read every order transmitted from Tokyo and all inter-fleet communications. This advance and intimate information had much to do in preparing the way and increasing the effectiveness of our great victory in the battle of Midway which broke the power of Japan in the Pacific. But some incautious member of a congressional committee or its staff leaked the information to a reporter, and 30 minutes after the next edition of his newspaper hit the street Japan changed her naval code and all further advantage was lost.

This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by honored and established precedent. This subcommittee, including the same personnel with the exception of two members who have since died, was the same committee which for something like 3 years provided in the annual appropriation bills a sum which finally totaled more than \$2 billion for the original atomic bomb. Session after session the money was provided, and the subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker of the House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure of the money. According to the testimony of all military

of all military authorities that bomb ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a million men who would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of Japan. No one has ever said that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that eventually aggregated more than the assessed valuation of some of the States of the Union for that purpose.

Espionage has been throughout recorded history an integral part of warfare. Before occupying the Promised Land Moses "by the commandment of the Lord" sent out from the wilderness of Paran 10 men under the direction of Joshua to spy out the land.

And no nation in the history of the world has practiced espionage more assiduously than Russia. The United States and every other allied nation today literally swarms with them. Within the last few weeks we sent to the Federal penitentiary at Atlanta a Russian spy convicted at Federal court who was regularly transmitting information directly to Moscow every night. Their spies stole from us the secret of the atomic bomb. Every Russian embassy and consulate has today time and again the number required for routine diplomatic and consular service. When we were at Oak Ridge we were told there were so many Russian spies there that only by a policy of strictest compartmentalism were they able to maintain the integrity of their work.

The need for espionage in this instance was exceptional and compelling. At the close of the world war in which we had saved Russia from complete subjugation we were surprised to learn that while all other nations were disarming and returning to a peace-time status as rapidly as possible, Russia was feverishly driving her factories and continuing to increase her armament at top speed. Simultaneously they announced that communism and free enterprise could not live in the same world.

Every effort has been made by American administrations to reestablish conditions under which we could discontinue excessive expenditures for armament and divert these vast sums to business and humanitarian purposes. But each year Russia has become more arrogant and threatening and more demanding.

Under our American ideals and system of government, a declaration of war against any nation, however provocative, is unthinkable. Our military authorities have no choice but to give any enemy the advantage of first attack and then depend on massive retaliation for defense. The Communists have taken every advantage of this situation.

In modern warfare surprise is a tremendous advantage. Less than a week before the Communist attack on Korea a congressional committee from this House returning from Seoul reported that permanent peace had been established and the land was returning to prosperity. There was no shadow of war; not the slightest cloud appeared on the horizon. The sudden rush of a vast army of well armed, well trained, and well munitioned communists across the border made it necessary for us to throw precipitately into battle raw and untrained troops who were wholly unable to protect themselves or hold their positions. And there followed one of the most disastrous periods in the history of American arms.

During the hearings

During the hearings on this appropriation for the last 2 or 3 years, I have each year asked the CIA representative before the committee, "How could the enemy mobilize an army of such size and accumulate hundreds of tons of supplies and munitions and the transportation facilities necessary for its movement without our learning that such an attack was in prospect?"

And each year we have admonished the Authority, the CIA, that it must meet future situations of this character with effective measures. We told them, "This must not happen again, and it is up to you to see that it does not happen again"; that the American forces must be apprised of any future preparation for attack in time to meet it. And the plan they were following when this plane was taken, is their answer to that demand.

And I want to take advantage of the opportunity to compliment and thank Director Allen W. Dulles and his remarkable corps for the admirable way in which they have met the situation through these later years.

They are entitled to the highest commendation by the Department, the Congress, and the American people.

We cannot permit another Korea. We cannot take the risk of carnage and national devastation which might involve every American city. We cannot take the risk of the consequences which would follow a similar attack from across the Russian borders. And since the Russians refuse to cooperate in our efforts to establish permanent peace—refuse even to agree to ethical standards of warfare—we have no choice but to protect our Nation and our people through the age-old methods of defense so long in use by the Communists themselves, lest we wake tomorrow, or do not wake tomorrow, as a result of our failure to know in time what they are planning against us.

The world has been appalled by the vicious vindictiveness of Khrushchev's denunciation. He yesterday characterized the policy of the United States as stupid and blundering. His fury is incited by the fact that it is neither stupid or blundering. On the contrary it has been infinitely successful and effective.

When we have answered his threats—and he has been very free with them on all occasions, even when he was here as our guest in our own country. When we have answered his threats by basing our Strategic Air Command in a position to defend ourselves and our allies, he has boasted that he could stop them at the border. That is why we are now so earnestly developing our submarines so that if he ever is able to neutralize our Strategic Air Command then we will have to take its place a fleet of nuclear-driven missile-firing submarines that will be just as effective a halter upon him as SAC is today.

His discovery that since 1956, for 4 years, CIA has been sending planes across his border—is the occasion for this outburst.

It completely disproves his vaunted ability to stop SAC at the border.

The only reason he was able to apprehend even this plane or its pilot was that it developed some unforeseen and unavoidable mechanical or physiological defect, the first in 4 years. He was unable to hit it or to overtake it at its cruising height of 70,000 feet.

So in order

So in order to leave the impression that he captured this plane he distributed a picture of a pile of rubbish which those who know the plane recognized as absolutely spurious. The plane and the pilot were evidently taken comparatively uninjured. That completely destroys his claims of invulnerability against American attack. So he as usual resorts to subterfuge.

And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident.

The world has always recognized the remarkable success of our form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an authoritarian dictatorship.

We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization.

Mr. ANDERSEN of Minnesota. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from New York Mr. TABER.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, that was the most magnificent and courageous speech I have heard on this floor in many a day. It is true that we have approached these Summit conferences with the idea that each side must be given the right to inspect and examine what the situation might be on the other side. That is the only way we can have peace as the result of these Summit conferences. We must have that right. When the leader of Russia refused us that right, the only method we had and the only chance we had was to get out and do just what was being done by this pilot. It was nothing compared to the spy work that was carried on by the Russians—nothing at all. Today, the leader of Russia knows that he could not overcome the United States with the airplanes and missiles that we have available. But we could not know what the proper targets were or know where they were or where they would be unless we had some means of checking up on them—and he left us no course to pursue except the course that we did pursue. That sort of approach was the only approach that we could make. I have served, as has the gentleman from Missouri, on the subcommittee that went into the question of the development of the atomic bomb and went into the questions of supplying the CIA and the other branches of our Government with funds necessary to take care of and protect the United States and its people. For my own part, just so long as I am here, I intend to support that position. We brought in from the Committee on Appropriations, under the leadership of the gentleman from Texas and the gentleman from Michigan MR. FORD a military appropriation bill designed to maintain the advantage that we have today over the Soviet. Let us go on and maintain it.

THE PLANE INCIDENT AND THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

MR. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, this is certainly a time in which Americans—and people everywhere—must keep their heads. We cannot afford hysteria, panic, or hasty and ill-advised action.

There are many unanswered questions about the incident of the American plane that was shot down over the Soviet Union. These are serious questions which will have to be considered very carefully by Congress and by the American people.

But it is doubtful whether the answers will be forthcoming immediately. There are too many facts which are not available and which will be available only when the Soviets permit a cool and realistic appraisal of what happened in their airspace.

Furthermore, it is always difficult to come to objective conclusions in an atmosphere of sanctimonious statements and threats against other nations. It is ridiculous for Nikita Khrushchev to profess such shocked surprise over efforts to gather information.

When Mr. Khrushchev visited this country last year, I do not think he impressed any of us as being a man who is naive. By that, I mean naive about what his own country has been doing for many, many years.

The incident, of course, will be assessed with great care and all of its implications will be explored carefully. But meanwhile, we cannot lose sight of the overriding reality which confronts us immediately.

It is whether this incident will become an excuse and an alibi for sabotaging the summit conference.

Within a very few days, our country is going to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union in an effort to relax the very tensions that have brought about this kind of an incident. It is difficult to imagine those negotiations as having much success if they are to be conducted in this kind of an atmosphere.

If Nikita Khrushchev is going to spend his time taunting the United States over what he considers the blunders it has made and threatening other countries on the basis of facts which have not been clearly established, there will be little time to talk about the real problems which divide the world.

Those problems cannot be traced back to the fact that nations seek to extract information from each other. Espionage and intelligence gathering are not something that cause the cold war. They are merely byproducts of the cold war—something that follows logically when nations cannot trust each other.

Whatever may be his motivations, it is obvious that Nikita Khrushchev has handled this incident in such a way as to draw attention away from the real problems. We must get back to those problems—of people, of armaments, of respect for the integrity of smaller nations—if the summit conference has any meaning.

If blunders have been made, the American people can be certain that Congress will go into them thoroughly. But this is something that should be done objectively and not merely as a panicky reaction to Soviet charges.

And I think that one point should be crystal clear. Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms and we are not going to be shaken from that course, or we are not going to be divided in this critical hour.

MR. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Texas will yield—

MR. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield..

MR. DIRKSEN. The Senator from Texas has made a forthright statement, and I concur in it.

This is not a time for us to retreat or walk backward; and I, for one, absolutely refuse to do so. To be sure, there is nothing that we need conceal particularly.

Certainly, ever since civilization began, there have been intelligence activities and espionage of a kind; and in proportion as civilization has become more complex, obviously the intelligence activities have become more complex.

During World War I, we set up the Office of Strategic Services. I had opportunities to examine their installations in many parts of the world.

So, Mr. President, as the majority leader has well put it, we would indeed be naive if we did not view this matter objectively and realistically; and we so stated yesterday when this matter was discussed on the floor of the Senate.

MR. BUSH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield to me?

MR. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

MR. BUSH. I wish to congratulate the majority leader on his strong and forceful statement; and I desire to associate myself with the expressions he has made.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of this colloquy an article entitled "In the New 'Wet War'—Russia Steps Up Her Spying," which appears in the current issue of the U.S. News & World Report.

MR. JOHNSON of Texas. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for his statement.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

From U.S. News & World Report, May 16, 1960

IN THE NEW "WET WAR"—RUSSIA STEPS UP
HER SPYING

Soviet espionage by fishing ships, submarines, is giving concern to U.S. officials. Innocent-looking trawlers, appearing off U.S. coasts, turn out to be loaded with radar, other electronic gear. Red fishing craft of large size have no fishing gear in sight, but can mother fleets of subs. Also showing up: missile-tracking ships, weather ships.

Now the Russians are opening up on still another front. It is a sudden, secretive invasion of all the world's oceans, including America's own home waters. Worried officials are calling this the "wet war."

With increased frequency, you hear of the Soviet ships or submarines prowling close to this Nation's coastal shores.

Late in April a U.S. Navy blimp photographed the Soviet fishing trawler Vega 60 miles off Long Island—and just a mile from where the first Polaris submarine George Washington was conducting important dummy-missile tests.

It wasn't the first time these seemingly innocent ocean-going vessels have acted so boldly. After the Vega incident, the Navy announced that the Soviets had scouted missile firings before.

In addition, it was only little more than a year ago that the Navy was ordered by President Eisenhower to board the trawler Novorossisk off Newfoundland after mysterious damage had been done to five transatlantic cables.

Now there are reports of still more cable cuttings in recent weeks.

WHY THERE'S CONCERN

These are only a few of the cases in the Pentagon's growing dossier on the "wet war." Officers have been aware of similar offshore intrusions by Russia before, so why the sudden new concern?

Mainly, it is because of what is being learned about the trawlers.

These are no ordinary fishing boats. The Novorossisk was a sizable ship of 1,670 tons, able to steam at 12 knots. The Vega is smaller, but photos under scrutiny show she carried no fishing gear in sight and was topheavy with detachable radar antennas capable of screening a vast expanse.

American intelligence marks this about the Vega: It was the very first of a new "loaded" type seen in these waters. All Soviet trawlers carry modern radar eyes and electronic ears but none observed previously was as well equipped as the Vega for close-up espionage.

Further, there is evidence that at least some of the craft, which nest regularly in the North Atlantic, can act as mother ships to restock—but not refuel—marauding Soviet submarines. Only their fuel capacities limit Soviet sub patrols. If they could establish refueling stations on this side of the Atlantic, they would be able to lie off American coasts on an almost permanent basis. How about reports that they are using north Cuban ports for just this purpose? So far, there is "absolutely no evidence of this," emphasize Navy specialists.

ON ALL SIDES

This "wet war" is not confined to the Atlantic. It is being carried close to the Pacific and gulf coasts of the United States as well. Several years ago, Communist submarines were detected farther away—off Venezuela and the Panama Canal, or were observed tracking the U.S. naval fleets.

Now there are more submarines--a total of 500 in the Russian Navy—and they are becoming more daring. In naval files are records of Soviet intrusions within 10 miles, and very probably much closer, of big cities such as New York, San Francisco, and New Orleans.

RUSSIA'S OBJECTIVES

What are these intruders looking for, and what—if anything at all—can be done about it?

The answer to the riddle of what they are up to comes from intelligence experts who have been investigating Soviet naval actions ever since World War II. They conclude the Russians are using their "wet war" for a variety of purposes.

The "trawlers," for example, can collect all sorts of useful information about Polaris-type tests, become familiar with the underwater characteristics of U.S. nuclear subs to make them easier to detect in the future. They can snoop on communications networks—the very heart of U.S. air defense—and some sources claim these trawlers could steer Soviet bombers through "electronic holes" in the distant early warning radan screen in Canada.

Russian submarines can chart the ocean floors surrounding the North American Continent. The purpose, as suspected by U.S. officials, is to prepare accurate maps so their nuclear submarine fleet, now being built, can navigate into exact undersea positions for missile firings against U.S. cities. With radar and infrared sensing devices, they can peer inland to mark targets on the American mainland.

A WORLDWIDE OPERATION

The "wet war," as waged by the Kremlin, is not confined to America. It is going on all around the world. In the mid-Pacific, once regarded as a private lake for the U.S. Pacific fleet, you find Soviet picket ships capable of tracking missiles. Russian subs slip out of pens in Albania to roam the Mediterranean, or move through the Taiwan Strait and south to Singapore from Siberian bases. Their weather ships linger suspiciously close to secret installations of U.S. forces in the Far East.

And, right under American noses, the Russians are conducting important research on minerals, according to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Democrat, of Washington. He wrote in a newspaper article that, 300 miles off Lower California, Soviet scientists "have taken sharp dee-sea photographs of the mysterious manganese-cobalt-nickel-copper nodules which thickly carpet the ocean floor in that and some other oceanic areas."

The tabulation of Russia's sudden interest in the oceans is almost without end. The Soviets have more ships and scientists in the polar regions than all other countries combined, and more ships and scientists assigned to deep ocean studies than any other nation.

"Soviet effort in oceanography is massive, of high caliber, and is designed to establish and demonstrate world leadership," warns Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. It all ties together. Victory in the "wet war"—ultimate

mastery of the seas—would give a great edge to Russia in any efforts to blanket American coastal areas with nuclear-tipped missiles fired from offshore perches. For such an attack, complete understanding of the oceans is needed. Currents, bottom topography, magnetic, and gravitational fields are all important things to a submarine skipper. Russia is making these studies all along American coasts, in midocean, along the Continental Shelves and in all the seven seas.

NEEDED: ALARM SYSTEM

This "wet war" will be intensified, predict American officers. Ask one of these experts what can be done about it, and he answers: "As long as the Communists stay outside our 3-mile limit, all we can do is grit our teeth." By law, the high seas are free for any nation to use.

The U.S. Navy, of course, does keep as sharp an eye as it can on Communist maneuvering. "Hunter-killer" search forces constantly survey the sea lanes. But this is not enough, say U.S. Navy men. What they would like is a burglar alarm system—a very expensive underseas sonar fence—that would keep tab on all Soviet submarines in peacetime, with the implied warning that any warlike move would mean sudden death.

This is still in the dream stage. For now, American officers caution, this country should brace itself for more Soviet submarine activity and bigger and faster trawlers operating near America's home waters, and all around the world, spying out data that would be helpful in an attack on the United States itself.

MR. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield to me?

MR. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

MR. KEATING. I wish to join the Senator from Connecticut in congratulating the distinguished majority leader on his extremely statesmanlike utterance. I know that he speaks for the people of the United States when he says they will not allow this incident to divide our country.

Of course it is regrettable that the incident occurred on the very eve of the summit conference, because it does give to Soviet Russia an opportunity to "explode a propaganda bomb," and perhaps places us at some psychological disadvantage.

However, I see no reason why this incident should endanger the hopes which all of us have for the forthcoming summit conference. As the majority leader has said, if ever we needed to act toward achieving a reduction of the tensions which exist in the world we must act to do so now.

Also, we must appraise this incident realistically. As the distinguished minority leader has said, spying is nothing new in the world. It is a recognized and accepted fact of life in the situation in which the world finds itself. Soviet planes engage in it regularly. They have flown over parts of Alaska, northern Canada, Japan, and other Western defense areas. As a matter of fact, Soviet spying has been a more expanded and intense operation than ours, because their spies have infiltrated into every area of the free world, whereas

handicapped our securing intelligence information. Of course, many more Russian spies have been caught than have Americans or those from other countries.

Finally, the circumstances surrounding this episode would never have existed if Russia had accepted the President's "open skies" proposal of several years ago.

I am more pleased than I can say to hear our distinguished majority leader stand up here in the way he has and express himself as he has. Knowing him as I do, it is the exact manner in which I would have expected him to act.

MR. JOHNSON of Texas. I thank the distinguished Senator.

MR. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

MR. CURTIS. I wish to commend the majority leader and other Senators who have spoken today in defense of our country. A number of us were serving in the other body when Pearl Harbor occurred. Following that episode, an investigation was moved, and a committee was established to investigate why Pearl Harbor had happened and why our armed services did not know more about it.

I think our armed services should be commended for finding out what is going on in the world.

In our cities we have fire inspectors going around, without our referring to them as spying. If the police forces give due attention to suspicious characters, nobody accuses them of spying.

Our Armed Forces are charged with a grave responsibility—the preservation of this Republic; and if we are not faced with a serious threat, then we are wasting about \$40 million a year, trying to defend ourselves.

I for one do not think we should shake and quake in our boots every time Khrushchev and his gang do not like what is going on. They never give the world an accurate story of it; and we should say, as a great patriot did, "Our country! May she always be in the right, but our country, right or wrong!"

MR. JOHNSON of Texas. I thank the Senator from Nebraska.

MR. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.

MR. WILEY. I, too, desire to join in the complimentary remarks the majority leader has made. I have never found him wanting. I believe that he is made of the mettle that makes America great.

I wish to say that while I have been interviewed several times, as a general rule I have refrained from remarks; but in this particular instance I spoke very definitely. First, I do not believe it is going to hurt the summit conference to have the facts about this incident disclosed.

Khrushchev has known all the time, the leaders who are to sit down at the table at the summit conference have known all the time, that Khrushchev has been playing a great international game of poker, and that we have certainly had our planes and our armed forces in Europe with an object. As has been suggested, that object has been that we shall not be caught again as we were at Pearl Harbor.

It was the privilege of some of us to be in a special meeting yesterday and we were briefed. What was said or done, of course, is not for me to say, but I came out of that meeting with the thought, "Thank God it has been demonstrated, to me at least, that we are alert, and not asleep."

Mr. President there appeared in the paper this morning the text of a statement issued by Secretary Herter. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD following these brief words of mine.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

From the Washington Post, May 10, 1960

TEXT OF STATEMENT ON PLANE

On May 7 the Department of State spokesman made a statement with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following supplements and clarifies this statement as respects the position of the U.S. Government.

Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union from wartime co-operation to postwar conflict, in 1946, and particularly since the Berlin blockade, the forceful takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Communist aggressions in Korea, and Vietnam, the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions. The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open societies of the free world and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously controlled.

With the development of modern weapons carrying tremendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise attack and aggression presents a constant danger. This menace is enhanced by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet leadership.

IKE PROPOSAL CITED

For many years the United States in company with its allies has sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so that he can go about his peaceful business without fear. Many proposals to this end have been put up to the Soviet Union. The President's "open skies" proposal of 1955 was followed in 1957 by the offer of an exchange of ground observers between agreed military installations in the United States, the U.S.S.R. and other nations that might wish to participate.

For several years we have been seeking the mutual abolition of the restrictions on travel imposed by the Soviet Union and those which the United States felt obliged to institute on a reciprocal basis.

More recently at the Geneva Disarmament Conference the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures of controlled disarmament. It is possible that the Soviet leaders have a different version and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack from the West. But this is hard to reconcile with their continual rejection of our repeated proposals for effective measures against surprise attack and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.

RESPONSIBILITY NOTED

I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of adject surrender or nuclear destruction. The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but the free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense. Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration.

Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization. The facts that such surveillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the Soviet leadership and the question indeed arises as to why at this particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.

This Government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that in the coming meeting of the heads of government in Paris Chairman Khrushchev will be prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective measures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction from the minds of people everywhere.

Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris, this incident should serve to underline the importance to the world of an earnest attempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards against surprise attack and aggression.

At my request and with the authority of the President, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, is today briefing members of the Congress fully along the foregoing lines.

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MR. JAVITS. Mr. President, second thoughts on the U-2 spy plane incident now show that its effect will be in reverse of what Chairman Khrushchev intended. The first flash of Mr. Khrushchev's theatricals has now worn off and reasonable men and women in the free world will have these things in mind. First, Mr. Khrushchev shows again that he wants to keep the world in the anxious seat rather than to calm its nerves. This is hardly a peace campaign or preparation for serious negotiation at the summit. Second, Mr. Khrushchev's rocket threats against Norway and Pakistan—so reminiscent of Suez in 1956—are hardly compatible with a just world.

secure in the opportunity for debate and the resolution of tensions through international law and negotiation. Third, the incident again recalls the unwillingness of Khrushchev to agree to President Eisenhower's open skies proposal which in turn shows American willingness to abandon secrecy and to insure the world against surprise attack. Fourth, Mr. Khrushchev highlights the danger of surprise attack and fixes attention upon the capability of one man in the Communist dictatorship by a sudden decision to plunge the world into an abyss of A- and H-bomb war.

Adult people will remember the spy networks of the U.S.S.R. which have operated for 40 years in the free world and the names of Klaus Fuchs, Ponte-Corvo, Igor Gouzenko, Gerhardt Eisler, and Colonel Abel. There is also evidence of U.S.S.R. aerial reconnaissance over free world areas including the United States—only we did not put on a propaganda show about it.

The U-2 incident should mobilize world opinion and bring it to bear upon the U.S.S.R. to put it in a mood to agree to pending treaties to protect against surprise attack, to end nuclear testing and for disarmament as consistently proposed by the free world nations. Second thoughts should show that the United States is not embarrassed, but that on the contrary, the free world's defensive alliances including the bases which implement them, are more necessary than ever.

As so often happens in these cases, the first impression is neither lasting nor correct. The Russian people themselves must now take careful account of what their regime means to peace. The cause and intentions of the free peoples are seen to be too deeply built to be shaken or confused by the theatraclals out of Moscow.